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REAPPORTIONMENT-LEGISLATIVE BODIESSignificant Deviation from Standard of Substantial
Population Equality of State Legislative Districts
Is Permissible To Provide Representatives for
Two Island Counties-Vigneault v.
Secretary of the Commonwealth*
In 1967 the Massachusetts legislature adopted a legislative reapportionment plan for the state's lower house.1 The 240 seats of
the lower house-the Massachusetts House of Representatives-were allocated along county lines as set forth in table 1.2 A resident of one of the Massachusetts mainland counties challenged
the state reapportionment plan as inconsistent with the one man-one
vote principle enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
Reynolds v. Sims.3 The mainland resident argued that the allocation
of one representative to each of the two island counties off the
Massachusetts coast-Nantucket, with a population of 3,714, and

• 237 N.E.2d 286 (Mass. 1968) [hereinafter principal case).
1. Ch. 877, § 11, [1967) Mass. Acts, amending MAss. GEN. LA.ws .ANN. ch. 57 (19112).
2. Principal case, app. A at 290. See page 588 infra.
3. 1177 U.S. 5113 (1964).
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TABLE 1

County
Barnstable
Berkshire
Bristol
Dukes
Essex
Franklin
Hampden
Hampshire
Middlesex
Nantucket
Norfolk
Plymouth
Suffolk
Worcester
Total
Average

Number of
Representatives

Population
in 1965

Population per
Representative

3
6
19

73;557
145,597
415.242
5,948
608,996
57,687
435,281
100,065
1,280,235
3,714
560,137
292,697
706,216
609,909

24,519
24,266
21,855
5,948
22,.'>56
19,229
21,764
25,018
22,073
3,714
22,405
22,515
22,069
21,782

1

27
3
20
4
58
1
25
13
32
28
240

5,295,281
22,064

County of Dukes, with a population of 5,948-was a violation of the
equal protection clause4 because it denied him an equal vote compared with island residents and equal representation in the state's
lower house. The plan gave each island one representative even
though the average population per representative statewide was
22,064, almost six times the population of Nantucket and over three
and one-half times that of the County of Dukes. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the island counties had a
long history of individual representation in the state legislature, that
the reapportionment plan was supported by a rational state policy,
that it followed the boundaries of existing political subdivisions
(counties), and that under the plan a majority of voters in counties
comprising 49.76 per cent of the population of the state could elect
enough representatives to control the lower house-only .66 per cent
less, according to the court, than the percentage of the population
required to control it if the apportionment had been mathematically
perfect. Thus, the court approved the plan; held, divergence from a
strict population standard in the apportionment of the state legislature is permissible in order to provide "genuine representation"
for island counties. 5
Since Baker v. Carr, 6 when the Supreme Court overruled a long
line of earlier decisions7 and concluded that the relationship of the
4. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § I.
5. Principal case at 289.
6. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
7. The earlier cases held that the Court would not adjudicate political questions
involving legislative reapportionment and dilution of individual voting power by state
law; see, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804
(1947); Remmy v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952).
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equal protection clause to a state's power to create geographical districts for legislative representation was a justiciable issue,8 state
apportionment plans have come under increasing judicial scrutiny. In
Gray v. Sanders,9 the Court held invalid a Georgia primary election
plan which favored voters from rural areas. Although Gray dealt
with the dilution of individual voting rights rather than legislative
reapportionment, it is important as the first enunciation of the nowfamous "one man-one vote" test. Specifically, the Court stated that
"[t]he conception of political equality from the Declaration of
Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing
-one person, one vote." 10
In a companion case, Wesberry v. Sanders,1 1 the Court ruled that
the phrase "by the People" in article 1 of the Constitution12 required
the federal congressional districts within a state to be as nearly equal
in population "as is practicable." Finally, in 1964 in Reynolds v.
Sims,13 the Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause required substantially equal legislative representation for all citizens
in a state regardless of where they reside. Therefore, the Court held
that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature should
be apportioned according to the "one man-one vote" rule. In Reynolds, the Alabama apportionment plan then in effect allowed a
majority of twenty-five per cent of the state's voters to elect a majority of the representatives in both houses of the legislature. 14 Proceeding from "the fundamental principle of representative government"-"equal representation for equal numbers of people" 15-the
Court established a presumption of unconstitutionality for any
legislative apportionment that deviates from the standard of equal
population.
The majority in Reynolds also stated that mathematical exactness
8. For a general discussion of the effect of the Court's reapportionment decisions,
see McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REv.
223 (1968). See also Scholle v. Hare, 369 U.S. 429 (1962) and WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 370
U.S. 190 (1962), both of which remanded cases challenging legislative apportionment
to lower courts for adjudication consistent with Baker v. Carr.
9. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
10. 372 U.S. at 381.
11. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
12. Article I, section 2 of the Constitution states: "The House of Representatives
shall be composed of Members chosen every second year by the People of the several
States ••••"
13. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). This is one of six apportionment cases decided the same
day. The others, which explain further the holdings in Reynolds v. Sims, are Lucas
v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock,
377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); and WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S.
633 (1964).
14. 377 U.S. at 545.
15. 377 U.S. at 560-61.
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was of course not always possible; 16 it left open a possible escape from
the rigors of the "one man-one vote" rule when it noted that some
deviation from the equal-population principle was constitutionally
permissible "so long as the divergencies ... are based on legitimate
considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state
policy." 17 Such deviations were to be permitted, however, only "as
long as the basic standard of equality of population among districts
is maintained." 18 As an example of permissible deviation from strict
mathematical apportionment by population, the Court mentioned
that a state might wish to establish voting districts to coincide with
existing political subdivisions, such as counties, in order to restrict
partisan gerrymandering or to insure some voice to political subdivisions as such. Although the Court stressed the essential role of
local governmental units-both as frequent objects of state legislation19 and as instruments in the effective operation of state government-as reason for this exception, it cautioned that a scheme giving
at least one seat to each county, if carried too far, could subvert the
"one man-one vote" principle. 20 After Reynolds, it was clear that
any permissible deviation from the standard of equal population
would have to be both "minor" and "based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy." 21
With regard to the first requirement, the Supreme Court has
never given a definitive statement of what it considers a "minor"
deviation from the equal-population principle. There are, however,
at least three different methods of measuring deviation. 22 The most
familiar method is to determine what is often referred to as the
population variance ratio. This ratio is designed to show the maximum variation throughout the state in population represented per
legislative seat.23 In Massachusetts, for example, Hampshire County's
100,065 residents were allotted four seats in the lower house, or one
representative for every 25,018 people; it was the most under16. 377 U.S. at 559-61.
17. 377 U.S. at 579.
18. 377 U.S. at 580.
19. The Court might also have noted that local governmental units play a particularly significant role in many important federal legislative programs such as urban
renewal.
20. 377 U.S. at 580-81. See also McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. REv. 645, 698-99 (1963).
21. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967). A more thorough discussion of Swann
follows in the text accompanying note 32 infra.
22. For a more extended analysis of these methods, see King, The Reynolds Standard and Local Reapportionment, 15 BUFFALO L. REv. 120, 131-35 (1965).
23. This was the method used in Kapral v. Jepson, 271 F. Supp. 74 (D. Conn. 1967),
in which a 2-to-l variance was held to dilute voting rights in contravention of the
fourteenth amendment.
In Sincock v. Gately, 262 F. Supp. 739 (D. Del. 1967), a ratio of 1.289 to 1 in the
Delaware general assembly and 1.33 to 1 in the Delaware state senate did not comply
with the equal protection clause.
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represented county in the lower house. But Nantucket County, population 3,714, was allotted one seat; it was the most over-represented
county in the Massachusetts house. The resulting ratio-25,018 to
3,714, or 6.7 to I-is the population variance ratio between the
state's two extreme districts.
The second means of assessing apportionment is the so-called
deviations-from-the-norm method. Here, the greatest deviation from
the average population per representative-or norm-is reflected and
expressed as a percentage of deviation. The norm is determined by
dividing the total number of seats in the particular legislative body
into the total population of the state. Thus, in Massachusetts, the
norm would be 22,064 residents per representative. 24 A particular
district's variation in population per representative from the norm
is then determined and divided by the norm to yield the percentage
of deviation. In Massachusetts, the greatest deviation from the norm
is, of course, Nantucket County. Its population of 3,714 varies from
the norm by 18,350 persons, and the percentage of deviation for this
county is thus 83 per cent under the 1967 reapportionment plan.26
The third identifiable method seeks to ascertain the lowest possible percentage of the state population needed to elect a majority of
the members of a state legislative body. This figure is determined by
adding the population of the most overrepresented districts until
the number of representatives from these districts is sufficient to
control the legislative branch under consideration. The population
of these districts is then expressed as a percentage of the total population of the state. 26 The Massachusetts court used a variant of this
approach in the principal case; 27 as noted above, it found that this
figure was 49.76 per cent. It then asserted that this was only .66 per
cent less than the percentage dictated by a purely mathematical apportionment and deemed the variation minor. 28
The principal case is the only recent decision to rely exclusively
24. Principal case at 289 n.5.
25. This was the method applied by a federal court in holding that legislative districts could vary ten per cent from the statewide ratio of population and still meet the
requirements of Reynolds in Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754 (D. Conn.
1964), afj'd sub nom. Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964).
26. See Note, Reapportionment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1228, 1250 (1966).
27. See principal case at 289 n.5, where the court calculated this figure by starting
from the proposition that 121 representatives could control the lower house. It then
multiplied by 121 the ideal number of citizens per representative (the norm), 22,064.
Thus, the court concluded that with mathematically perfect districts a majority of
2,669,744 people-50.42 per cent of the state's total population-could elect 121 representatives. The court further assumed that there were 119 mathematically perfect districts plus the two island counties; by multiplying 119 by the norm of 22,064 and then
adding 3,714 (Nantucket's population) and 5,948 (Dukes' population), the court concluded that a majority of 2,635,278 people--49.76 per cent of the state's populationcould elect 121 representatives. Of course, subtracting the two percentages yields .66
per cent, the figure which the court relied on to show that deviations were "minor."
28. Principal case at 289.
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upon this third method. 29 The obvious difficulty of relying on only
one measure of deviation-particularly this one-is illustrated by
the court's opinion. It suggests that the Massachusetts plan actually
affords substantially equal representation without discussing the
sizable deviations which the first two methods of measurement reveal. 30 Thus, with respect to the requirement that any deviations
from substantially equal representation must be "minor," it seems
clear that the Massachusetts court's test-at least as presented in the
opinion-must be rejected as misleading. Moreover, according to
precedent, a variance ratio of 6. 7 to I and a deviation from the norm
of eighty-three per cent cannot be considered minor. Without
specifically defining what is "minor" and adhering to the statement
in Reynolds that "[w]hat is marginally permissible in one State may
be unsatisfactory in another .. .''31 the Supreme Court has recently
considered three different reapportionment plans which supposedly
presented only minor deviations from the equal-population principle.
In Swann v. Adams,32 the Court struck down a reapportionment
plan for the Florida state legislature at least in part because the
respective variance ratios for the state senate and house were 1.30 to
I and 1.41 to I, and the respective percentages of deviation from the
norms were 15.09 and 18.28 per cent.33 In Duddleston v. Grills,34 the
Court relied on Swann and vacated district court approval of the
Indiana congressional apportionment plan which yielded a 1.2-to-l
variance ratio and a 12.8 per cent deviation from the norm.35 Similarly, in Kilgarin v. Hill, 36 the Court relied on Swann to state, in
dicta, that the variance ratio of 1.31 to I and a 14.84 per cent deviation in the Texas House of Representatives probably were not minor
variations that would permit retention of established political sub29. In Reynolds the Court suggested that this third method should be used in
stating that under the contested apportionment "only 25.1 % of the State's total popula•
tion resided in districts represented by a majority of the members of the [state] Senate,
and only 25.7% lived in counties which could elect a majority of the members of the
[state] House of Representatives." 377 U.S. at 545.
30. See Note, supra note 26, at 1250: ''While all [three of] these measuring rods may
be helpful, none is alone sufficient to determine the extent, and consequently the
legitimacy, of a deviation from absolute equality."
In Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310 (M.D. Pa. 1964), the court used a fourth
method that is somewhat unusual; it ruled that counties could be used as the basis for
representation so long as the population deviations did not differ from the statewide
ratio by a major fraction (½ or larger). This meant that if the statewide ratio was
10,000 people per representative, any deviation of 5,000 or more would be invalid. Such
an approach, however, merely restricts the deviation from the norm to less than 50
per cent.
31. 377 U.S. at 578.
32. 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
33. 385 U.S. at 442.
34. 385 U.S. 455 (1967).
35. Grills v. Branigan, 255 F. Supp. 155, 158 (S.D. Ind. 1966).
36. 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
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divisions as voting districts. The Massachusetts figures, being several
times larger than those in the cases noted, do not seem to permit
a finding that the reapportionment plan involved only a minor deviation from the equal-population principle. Even disregarding the
effect of the allocation of two seats to the counties in the principal
case, the Massachusetts plan presents, in Hampshire County, a variance ratio of 1.31 to 1 and a deviation from the norm of 13.3 per
cent-figures perilously close to those disapproved in the above cases.
Assuming for the purposes of the ensuing discussion that the
deviations in the principal case could be termed minor under any
acceptable method of measurement, it is questionable whether the
plan satisfies the second requirement of the Reynolds exception from
the principle of population equality-that is, that the deviations
must be "based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy."37 The tenor of the court's opinion
was essentially the same as the reasoning rejected in Reynolds-the
fear that people in one area of the state would not be adequately
represented if their district was combined with another area of larger
population. The Massachusetts court stated: "The executive and
legislative departments of the Commonwealth manifestly believe
that genuine representation of the islands would not survive should
they be merged into a mainland district or districts. We share that
belief ...." 38
The findings of the legislature which the court relied on in
reaching this conclusion presented only the most general reasons for
preserving individual representation for the island counties. The
legislature stated that "[t]hese are islands, isolated, not readily accessible and most difficult to merge with any portion of the mainland . . . ." 39 The court's assertion that the districting was proper
was tied to the statements in Reynolds concerning permissible deviations.40 The Massachusetts court's opinion stated that the islands
constitute two compact, contiguous districts whose borders conform to natural boundaries and whose right to representation as
entities in the General Court [the state legislature] antedates by
nearly eighty years the meeting of the First Continental Congress.
The districting of the islands follows existing political subdivision
lines and aims to restrict the possibility of partisan gerrymandering
and to give effect to the county role in the governmental system of
the Commonwealth.41

Aside from the fact that the Supreme Court's opinion in Reynolds
imposed the requirement, discussed above, that deviations based
'!,7.
'!,8.
'!,9.
40.
41.

Reynolds v. Sims, '!,77 U.S. 5'!,3, 579 (1964).
Principal case at 289.
Ch. 877, § 1, [1967] Mass. Acts, amending MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 57 (1932).
'!,77 U.S. at 577-81.
Principal case at 289 (footnotes omitted).
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upon such factors must be minor, the Massachusetts opinion is insufficient because it speaks only in conclusory terms. 42 It may be that
the island counties in the principal case present a situation in which
the deviations are legitimate; however, any such finding must be
based on a more persuasive presentation of concrete reasons for
abandoning the equal-population principle than that presented by
the Massachusetts court.
The arguments offered in support of separate representation for
the two islands are strikingly similar to those offered in support of
similar treatment for sparsely populated rural areas vis-a-vis large
urban centers-the situation obtaining in most reapportionment
cases. The Supreme Court has made it clear that arguments based
upon the unique character, interests, and needs of rural areas are
unconvincing when they are advanced to show the inadequacy of
representation that would result if such areas were merged with
urban areas in the same district. For example, in Lucas v. FortyFourth General Assembly of Colorado the Court held that substantially equal representation by population must obtain in both the
rural and urban areas of Colorado, despite the strong dissent of
Justice Clark, who argued:
The state has mountainous areas which divide it into four
regions, some parts of which are almost inpenetrable. There are also
some depressed areas, diversified industry and varied climate, as
well as enormous recreational regions and difficulties in transportation. These factors give rise to problems indigenous to Colorado ....43
It is difficult to find any compelling reasons why islands present a
better case for separate representation than do such diversified areas,
and the Massachusetts court offers none. Looking, then, to what
appears to be the court's rationale in the principal case-that equal
representation would deny effective representation-it seems that
the case for "legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation
of a rational state policy" has not been made.
It remains to consider whether such a general exemption from
strict apportionment by population does or should exist. There is
42. In the section of the Reynolds opinion relied upon by the Massachusetts court
in the principal case, the Supreme Court emphasized that:
Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes. Considerations of area alone
provide an insufficient justification for deviations from the equal-population principle. Again, people, not land or trees or pastures, vote. Modern developments and
improvements in transportation and communications make rather hollow, in the
mid-1960's, most claims that deviations from population-based representation can
validly be based solely on geographical considerations. Arguments for allowing
such deviations in order to insure effective representation for sparsely settled areas
and to prevent legislative districts from becoming so large that the availability of
access of citizens to their representatives is impaired are today, for the most part,
unconvincing.
377 U.S. at 580.
43. 377 U.S. 713, 742 (1964).
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nothing in the Constitution that either requires or permits the
specific exceptions mentioned in Reynolds, and it is clear that the
state must justify any population deviations among districts. 44 Moreover, the later decisions indicate that such justification is quite
difficult; in fact, the exceptions to the equal-population principle
may be of decreasing significance. In Avery v. Midland County 45 the
Court extended the "one man-one vote" standard to units of local
government. Although the Court's formulation of the standard46
was basically similar to that of the earlier cases, the majority opinion
phrased the issue broadly as "whether the Fourteenth Amendment
likewise forbids the election of local government officials from districts of disparate population." 47 Commenting upon the resolution of
this question in the affirmative, Justice Fortas' dissent stated that
"[t]his holding, literally applied as the Court commands, completely
ignores the complexities of local government in the United Statescomplexities which, Reynolds itself states, demand latitude of prescription."48 This interpretation of the Avery opinion is bolstered
by the fact that the majority-unlike that in Reynolds-makes no
mention of any permissible grounds for deviation from a standard
of strict population equality in districting for units of local government having general governmental powers. Moreover, the circumstances in which the Court granted certiorari in Avery were somewhat unusual. The Texas Supreme Court had already ruled that,
under "the requirements of the Texas and the United States Constitutions,"40 the plan was invalid; however, the state supreme court
disagreed with the state trial court's conclusion that local governmental units were required to have substantially equal populations
and stated that such factors as the "number of qualified voters, land
areas, geography, miles of country roads and taxable values" 50 could
be considered in drawing district lines. Arguably, there was an adequate state ground for the state court's decision and it was clear that
a new plan of apportionment would be drawn up. 51 Assuming that
this was the case, it appears that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to prevent the Texas court's assertion that factors other than
population could be considered in a new districting scheme from
having any effect. Justice Fortas stated that the majority,
44. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967). See also McKay, supra note 8, at
232-33.
45. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
46. 390 U.S. at 484-85.
47. 390 U.S. at 479.
48. 390 U.S. at 499 Gustice Fortas, dissenting).
49. 406 S.W.2d 422, 425 (1966).
50. 406 S.W.2d 428.
51. There was disagreement between the majority and the dissenters in Avery as
to whether the grant of certiorari was proper. Compare the majority position, 390
U.S. at 478 n.2 with Justice Harlan's dissent, 390 U.S. at 486-87.

596

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67

now plunges to adjudication of the case ... in midstream, apparently
because it rejects any result that might emerge which deviates from
the literal thrust of one man, one vote. Since it now adopts this
simplistic approach, apparently the majority believe that they might
as well say so and save Texas the labor of devising an answer.52
Although Avery may not have been intended to eliminate the
exception to the equal-population principle set forth in Reynolds,
it is susceptible of that interpretation. Such a demand for absolutely
strict population equality would be consistent with the concern expressed by the Court in another area involving voting rights. In
cases involving access to the polls, the Court has consistently held
tliat intentional deviations from equal protection are invalid, regardless of state policy in setting up the qualification upon the right
to vote. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections 53 the Court struck
down a state poll tax, holding:
To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's
qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor. The
degree of discrimination is irrelevant . . . . [T]he requirement of
fee paying causes an "invidious" discrimination ... that runs afoul
of the Equal Protection Clause.54
It would be consistent to argue in a situation such as the principal
case that a mainland resident's vote is no less diluted by the apportionment scheme because the state claims it has good reason to
dilute it. Of course, such a contention depends upon the underlying
premise that the franchise is so fundamental in a democratic
society55 that dilution of the right to vote is as improper as denying
it altogether. Since it is the right to vote that is at stake, perhaps the
degree of dilution of some citizens' votes should be irrelevant and
even minor deviations from strict population equality should be
held impermissible.
Thus, if review of the principal case is sought, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would approve the Massachusetts
plan. The Court could base this result upon any of three rationales:
(1) that the divergence from the equal-population standard is "substantial"; (2) that the deviations, even if minor, were not included
in pursuance of a rational state policy but rather for reasons that
the Court rejected in Reynolds; or, (3) that as a result of Avery and
cases like Harper, the only variations permitted are those which
52. 390 U.S. at 496 (dissent).
53. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
54. 383 U.S. at 668.
55. "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is the essence of a
democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). See also Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380; Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 242 (1962) Gustice Douglas, concurring).
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occur because of the impossibility of drawing legislative districts with
exact mathematical precision.
Since the first two rationales seem adequate, the Court might
choose not to discuss the effect of Avery; basing such a decision on
that case would involve an explicit departure from Reynolds. However, resting a reversal on a strict application of the equal-population
principle would assure that Reynolds could not be circumvented by
entrenched state legislators who maneuver to avoid districts of equal
population. Such a decision would also greatly reduce the volume
of litigation which has arisen and can continue to arise if the justification for and the extent of deviations must be examined on a case-bycase basis.116 The Court has had sufficient time to re-examine the effect
of its initial decisions. It has not yet approved of a single deviation
in any of the cases that have come before it, and this may indicate
that its earlier formulation of the equal-population principle in
Baker and Reynolds was a concession to strong political opposition
and should now be abandoned in favor of one requiring strict equality of population in legislative districts.
In Massachusetts, the first step in applying such a standard would
be to divide the average population per legislative seat, 22,064,
into the population of each county. This would give the following
allocation:
TABLE 2

County
Barnstable
Berkshire
Bristol
Dukes
Essex
Franklin

Hampden
Hampshire
Middlesex

Nantucket
Norfolk
Plymouth

Suffolk
,vorcester
Total
Average

Number of
Representatives

Population
in 1965

Population per
Representative

3
7
19
0
27
3
20
5
58
0
25
13
32
28

73fJ57
145fJ97
415,242
5,948
608,996
57,687
435,281
100,065
1,280,235
3,714
560,137
292,697
706,216
609,909

24fJ19
20,800
21,855

240

5,295,281

22fJ56
19,229
21,764
20,013
22,073
22,405
22fJ15
22,069
21,782
22,Q64

This initial distribution would be invalid; Dukes and Nantucket
Counties are unrepresented, Barnstable County is underrepresented,
56. In his dissent in Avery, Justice Harlan stated that the present formulation of
the "one man-one vote" standard has proved unsatisfactory because "[a] number of
significant administrative questions remain unanswered [including the degree of permissible population variation], and the burden on the federal courts has been sub•
stantial." ll90 U.S. at 489.

598

Michigan Law Review

and Franklin County is overrepresented. Of course, there are many
ways to resolve these problems; some would require redrawing district lines and others would involve merging existing units. One
possibility is that the two island counties be merged with Barnstable County and the new unit given four representatives. This
would result in a county with a population per representative of
approximately 20,805-a figure sufficiently close to the norm to be
acceptable. Such a combination would be more beneficial in terms of
representation of the islands' special interests than merging each one
with a separate mainland county. It would give them combined
strength in the new unit that would perhaps be more significant
quantitatively than if they were each merged into larger counties.
Moreover, the qualitative aspect of the islands' representation could
be improved since a merger with Barnstable County-which includes
Cape Cod-would group them with another coastal area with
similar interests in terms of public works, conservation, and the
promotion of tourism. To maintain a lower house with 240 seats,
Franklin County might have to yield one seat and be redrawn to
include only 44,000 residents. The remaining areas from the former
Franklin County would then have to be added to contiguous counties
that are overrepresented to a slight degree. Such a process would
bring the districting close to mathematical precision, minimizing
both underrepresentation and overrepresentation.

